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The author is Professor of Medicine at Georgetown University. 
The United States currently spends approximately 14% of its gross domestic 
product for health care, and this is likely to climb to 18% of GOP by the end of the 
decade.! In contrast, the United States spends roughly 6% of GOP both for 
education and defense. It is clear that the greatest part of our increase in health 
care costs is best understood as a result not of the failures of medicine, but of its 
successes. The expanding capabilities of medicine, with the marvelous advances 
in biomedical technology and pharmacotherapy, together with specialization in 
the medical profession, have certainly contributed greatly to the current situation. 
The unbridled appetite for health care on the part of the public and our 
continuing expansion of the definition of "health" also contribute to this 
escalation. 
This increase in costs is certainly alarming. A recent Harris poll indicates that 
94% of the respondents thought health care needed "fundamental reform or to be 
completely rebuilt."2 Since the introduction of President Clinton's Health Care 
Reform Act, this is now an official matter of concern for the Congress and the 
nation. Certainly the next two years will see the attempt to solve this problem as 
one of the major political activities of the American people. 
The concern for public expenditures for health care implies a rhetorical 
question: where will it all end? We recognize that even government budgets are 
not without limits. We know that what goes into health care will have to be 
diverted from other areas of public concern. Health insurance premiums tum out 
to be an increasingly heavy burden on individual incomes. Can we afford to 
continue as if the sky is the limit? A second rhetorical question can be asked: does 
pouring more money into the health care system indeed buy a commensurate 
increase in actual health, prolongation of life, and relief of pain and suffering? If 
the answer to this second question is "no," it is certainly time to consider the 
limits of medicine as well as the limits of the welfare state. 
In considering limits, the specter of rationing raises its head. Daniel Callahan 
has argued persuasively that universal health care is neither feasible nor plausible 
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without health care reationing.3 Rationing is a word that packs many meanings. 
To some, rationing means cost containment. To others, rationing means that 
some individuals are uninsured. To still others rationing is understood as an 
inordinate waiting period for medical service. When a precise definition of 
rationing is not utilized by all, ethical discourse concerning its value and disvalue 
is very difficult. 
Dr. William Schwartz of Tufts Medical School has written extensively on 
rationing. He defines it as "not all care expected to be beneficial is provided to all 
patients."4 Such a definition would imply that the withdrawal of Nancy Cruzan's 
feeding tube as sanctioned by her legitimate surrogate, her father, would be a 
form of rationing. Such is clearly not the case. 
The definition of rationing which I wish to use in considering the ethics of same 
is "the intentional withholding of needed diagnostic services or effective medical 
therapy by the patient's individual physician on the perception by the physician 
of scarce resources."5 This is the definition which we at the Center for Clinical 
Bioethics at Georgetown University use in considering the ethical issues involved 
in rationing. This, of course, precludes a discussion on the ethics of the action of a 
community, e.g., Oregon, or, indeed, of the greater community, the nation, 
through the ordered political processes to produce cost containment by limiting 
the amount of money to purchase health care services and of deciding just what 
health care services will be purchased and for whom. This problem of setting 
limits for health care in the macroeconomic world is considered under the rubric 
of the allocation of resources. Society in general resists such limits. Such setting of 
limits creates different problems and requires a different ethical consideration, 
primarily one concerning distributive justice. This is quite different from the 
ethical considerations required when the individual patient's physician makes a 
determination to withhold needed and effective diagnostic and/or theraputic 
modalities based on that individual physician'S perception of scarce resources.6 
As Ten Haave has pointed out, the resource allocation debate is set about a 
distinction which is made between the limits of care and the limits in care.7 These 
terms refer respectively to limiting the health care system, which is regarded as a 
responsibility of government, and to limiting the care of individual patients or 
patient categories, which is considered to be the responsibility of health care 
professionals. Morrein, in considering the Oregon health plan, well understands 
this.8 He argues for a clear separation between the duty of a doctor to decide what 
a patient needs and the duty of the supplier of resources to decide what can be 
paid for. The key issue appears to be the analysis of the relationship between the 
common good and the good of individuals. What matters ethically seems to be 
not only the minimum of health care that should be due to all, but also the upper 
limit of optimal care we should attempt to achieve. Within our present system 
unlimited claims are generated. On this fragile basis, the health care policy of 
equal access and financial solidarity produces an almost uncontrollable system, 
which we now all recognize, and with which we struggle for solution. The body 
politic currently has set external limits as a policy favored to control these 
spiralling costs, i.e., a la carte discounting, rate setting, formula driven utilization 
controls, technology utilization assessment, micromanagement of providers for 
February, 1994 67 
wasted expenditures and excessive administrative costs, etc. These are measures 
and regulations initiated by governmental authorities and carried out at the 
institutional level. It has been repeatedly argued that this external approach will 
remain unsuccessful and morally inadequate as long as there is no evolution from 
external to internal limits. 
The argument is made well by Ten Haave and others that we must learn 
autonomously whether or not to restrict our claims to health care and whether to 
withdraw or not from a system of scarcity. The withdrawal is in large part 
maintained by an obsession with longevity, i.e., in the sense of "surviving others," 
living longer than and thus outliving others as a consequence of an inability to 
integrate and accept death and suffering as an integral component of life. Gaylin 
put it very well.9 "People will pay anything to defend against the possibility of 
death, all the more so when money involved doesn't come directly out of their 
own pockets." 
The concept of autonomy is very often linked with the concept of solidarity. 
Self-determination may be considered to imply, in a Kantian interpretation of 
autonomy, an ability to restrain our claims for the benefits of others. Self-
determination should involve responsibility on the individual's part, indeed, for 
the self-realization of the other members of the community. 
In any system, if the physician decides that he or she will be the arbiter of 
rationing, I believe we have fallen upon very hard times, indeed. We can ask the 
question: "Why is it unethical for the individual physician to be the determiner of 
rationing in the sense that I have defined it above?" 
First of all, the physician's role as expressed in the Hippocratic Oath is to act 
benevolently, i.e., in the best interests of his or her patient. This means, of course, 
that the physician will do all in his or her power to bring cure or comfort to the 
sick individual. This means that the physician will bring effective diagnostic 
methods and treatment to the patient as needed. The physician will not utilize 
ineffective, futile, or burdensome treatment, but treatment that is beneficial and 
effective. Effective treatment is defined as treatment which cures the disease or 
corrects and brings more toward normal the functional incapacitation that the 
disease or condition imposes. Beneficial treatment may not be effective, but 
brings about an enhancement of the individual patient's life values. The concept 
of beneficence, however, does not mean acquiescing to the patient's every whim 
under the rubric of respecting autonomy. Patient requests can be far-fetched and 
invalid claims against the physician. Giving antibiotics to a patient suffering from 
a viral upper respiratory tract infection is an example of such. It is incorrect 
medical practice. It is not a form of rationing to withhold this ineffective 
treatment, and it is inappropriate for the physician to acquiesce to the patient's 
request for this treatment under any condition. Such withholding is not rationing. 
The physician, in representing the best interests of the patient, however, and 
acting upon these is obliged to give to the patient necessary and effective 
treatment, insofar as the physician can judge its effectiveness, no matter how 
scarce the resources! If the individual physician withholds due to the perception 
of preserving scarce resources, he is acting unethically, in my opinion, for he or 
she is not acting in the best interests of the patient. 
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In withholding necessary treatment the physician is basically making an 
ethical judgement on the value of that particular individual's life. An illustration 
of this is well-documented in an anecdotal report. One of the members of our 
Center for Clinical Bioethics was speaking to the medical staff of a local hospital 
and presented this scenario to the staff: 
A mildly demented 80-year old minority woman was brought to the emergency room of 
the hospital vomiting blood and passing blood through her rectum. 
The staff members were given three scenarios and asked how they would handle 
the case: 1) admit the patient to the hospital for a diagnostic work-up to 
determine the cause of the bleeding and, if correctable, to correct it; 2) to admit to 
the hospital but give comfort care only; or 3) to refrain from admitting to the 
hospital. One quarter of the physicians argued that because of the expected poor 
quality of life, "dementia and age," and because of scarce resources, e.g., limited 
supply of blood, overused radiographic facilities, the limited number of beds in 
Intensive Care, and other cost factors related to hospital operations, that they 
would not admit. Such rationing of services based on consideration by one 
individual of the "low quality of life" of another individual debases all forms of 
human life and particularly puts the more vulnerable - the poor, the elderly, the 
demented, and minorities - at greater risk. Nat Hentoff, in an op-ed article in the 
Washington Post, of Tuesday, August 18, 1992, writing about the famous 
Oregon Plan, which made "quality of life" a factor in rationing, made a very 
profound statement.10 He talked about the increasing number of physicians and 
politicians around the country convinced that money is wasted on people with a 
low "quality oflife." He suggested that all such physicians should take a moment 
to think on the advice of the eighteenth century German physician, Dr. Cristophe 
Hufeland, who was Professor of Medicine in Halle and a great humanist. In 
letters to both Goethe and Herder on medicine, he said, "If the physician 
presumes to take into consideration in his work whether life has value or not, the 
consequences are boundless and the physician becomes the most dangerous man 
in the state." 
The phenomenon of illness makes an unequal partnership between the 
physician and the patient, a partnership which is based upon mutual trust and 
respect. The patient is vulnerable. The patient is weak, frightened, and often 
hostile or angry. The patient suffers a loss of freedom. There is an inequality in 
power and knowledge between the physician and patient. Illness causes an 
assault upon self-image. The patient is exploitable. It is on the basis of trust that 
the patient turns to the physician with superior knowledge and power, and in 
trust relies fully on the physician'S good offices to do the right thing. If the 
physician determines a program of rationing, the physician has broken this trust 
with the patient. The physician, in acting as a referee for society to protect scarce 
resources, is violating a most fundamental ethical principle in the practice of 
medicine, namely beneficence in the best interests of the patient. 
In addition, it is hard to see that a decision in the microeconomic sphere, i.e., 
withholding a single treatment, diagnostic procedure, or therapeutic modality, 
will indeed permit a better distribution of scarce resources. No physician, 
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withholding an effective treatment from an individual out of the perception of 
scarce resources, can be assured that the resources which he freed and allegedly is 
protecting will be distributed in a way that will fulfill the canons of distributive 
justice. 
Dr. Marcia Angell, the capable deputy editor of the New England Journal of 
Medicine, has written about physicians as double agents. I I By this she refers to the 
dual role of the physicians working in some settings such as in an HMO or 
another managed care enterprise. In such organizations the physician is called 
upon to be an agent both for the patient and, at the same time, an agent for 
society. As an agent for society the physician is called upon, in a sense, to ration 
resources at the level of patient care. This refers to the so-called "restrictive 
gatekeeper" role that a physician is asked to play in a health maintenance 
organization.12 The gatekeeper role sets up a conflict of interest for the physician 
between medical practice and the economic aspects of the physician's work. 
Requirements of the organization for a certain number of patients to be serviced 
in a given time by the physician may preclude expenditure of adequate time with 
each patient to render the needed medical care. The requirement to hold down 
costs for the organization by not utilizing needed laboratory and therapeutic 
modalities, under the guise of scarcity, precludes the physician's acting in the best 
interests of the patient because his or her economic well-being may be contingent 
upon the withholding of needed services. Withholding from one patient in a 
single cohort of patients in an HMQ violates distributive justice, which requires 
that all like individuals in a given category must be treated the same, regardless of 
all their differences. In other words, it rations by making a judgement on a person 
rather than on technology. 
In sum, rationing, when practiced by the physician at the bedside, limits the 
cargiver's ability to act in the best interests of the particular patient. It destroys the 
trust relationship between patient and physician. It promotes, fosters and 
legimates discrimination and bias. It makes the patient a means rather than an 
end, in that the patient is used and manipulated for the purpose of saving certain 
finite material goods for the sake of other patients whose lives are considered to 
be of more worth. It forces the physician to act in a way which violates 
distributive justice. 
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